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1 Introduction
As is evidenced by the world financial crisis since 2008, globalization has
closely interlinked business cycles in different countries with one another.
While this interlinkage has extensively been studied in the literature on
economics under uncertainty,1 it has not been given much attention to in
the literature on deterministic dynamic economics. In closed-economy mod-
els, in contrast, it has been established that endogenous fluctuations can
be explained by the fundamental structure of production and consumption
without uncertainty.2 Despite this, little has been known on how trade af-
fects deterministic-factor-driven periodic cycles in different countries. In this
paper we provide such an analysis considering a two-country, two-good, two-
factor general equilibrium model with CIES non-linear preferences, asym-
metric technologies across countries and decreasing returns to scale in the
production of all goods. We exhibit a global destabilization effect of inter-
national trade by proving that the openning of trade can create persistent
endogenous fluctuations at the world level while the closed-economy equi-
librium in each country is saddle-point stable.
Up to now, the lack of results in the literature is due to the difficulty
that exists, in general, in making a comparative dynamic analysis for a dy-
namic general equilibrium model with heterogenous consumers. In order
to compare pre- and post-trade endogenous cycles, it is necessary to make
such a comparison in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heteroge-
nous consumers (representing home and foreign consumers). Although, in
the representative consumer case, country-wise endogenous cycles in a pre-
trade equilibrium is determined by the representative agent’s utility func-
tion, world periodic cycles in a post-trade equilibrium can be characterized
only by a world social utility function.3 The difficulty in characterizing this
world social utility function has hampered a comparison between pre- and
post-trade equilibrium paths in terms of the fundamental parameters of a
model.
In the present study, we demonstrate that this difficulty can be overcome
1See for instance Cole and Obstfeld [11], and Obstfeld [29].
2See Benhabib and Nishimura [5, 6], Boldrin and Montrucchio [8], Mitra and Sorger
[22], Nishimura and Yano [28].
3See Negishi [23], Bewley [7].
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by assuming non-linear CIES utility functions. This assumption enables us
to characterize completely the local behavior around the steady state of
pre- and post-trade equilibrium paths by means of the determinant and the
trace of the matrix determining the linear approximation of the transition
dynamics. Moreover, we apply for the first time in the international trade
literature the geometrical methodology developed by Grandmont, Pintus
and de Vilder [18] to analyse the local stability properties of a two-country,
two-good, two-factor model. Such a methodology appears to be a crucial
tool when the utility function is non-linear.
Our characterization allows to reveal what we call the macroeconomic
destabilization effect of international trade. That is to say, the openning of
trade can create persisting endogenous cycles in both countries, even if in
each country’s pre-trade equilibrium, endogenous fluctuations are eventually
to disappear over time or even do not exist.4 Although the possibility of the
presence of this destabilization effect of international trade has been hinted
in the work of Nishimura and Yano [26],5 no proof has yet been known in the
existing literature. Contrary to all the previous papers on trade in dynamic
general equilibrium models in which the focus was on turnpike results,6
we concentrate on the instability of the steady state and the occurrence of
periodic cycles. Up to our knowledge, beside the paper by Bajona and Kehoe
[2] in which it is shown that positive trade with endogenous cycles may
occur within an Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) infinite horizon model
with two consumption goods, our methodology allows to provide the first
proof of existence of endogenous fluctuations in a non-HOS optimal growth
model of international trade with non-linear preferences.
We consider a two-country, two-sector model in which producers of one
country differ from those of the other country in respect to the share of
capital and labor in each sector. Contrary to Bajona and Kehoe [2], we
then depart from the standard HOS formulation in which the technologies
4In the recent literature studying the economic growth in the very long run, interna-
tional trade is also shown to have asymmetrical effects on the evolution of industrial and
non-industrial countries. As a result it may explain the “Great Divergence” in income per
capita across countries in the last two centuries. See Galor and Mountford [15, 16].
5The existence of endogenous fluctuations is also studied but under the restrictive
assumption of a linear utility function in both countries (see also Nishimura, Venditti and
Yano [24, 25]).
6See for instance Yano [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].
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are symmetric across countries. In order to characterize the stability prop-
erties of free-trade equilibrium paths, we assume that the technologies are
strictly concave Cobb-Douglas functions. Decreasing returns indeed allow
to guarantee the diversification of production in each country and to get
a non-degenerate social production function at the world level. Based on
that, it is also a crucial assumption to generate the destabilization effect
of international trade. We finally assume that labor is inelastic, and that
the citizens of both countries have the same time discount factor. Although
strong simplifying assumptions are considered, this model is sufficient to
analyze the impact of a common market on the local stability properties of
the steady state.7
We consider a trade reform which is based on two levels of integration. In
the lowest level, countries are closed economies and the produced goods and
inputs are traded only on domestic markets. The highest level is obtained
after a trade agreement in which the countries trade the consumption good
and capital on a common market with no transaction costs but labor is im-
mobile. Such a sequence, built upon two polar cases, can be seen as extreme
on many grounds, but we think that the message would not be significantly
affected by generalizations leading to more complex configurations.
The geometrical analysis allows us to obtain several conclusions. First,
we show that in a closed economy, the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations
requires a sufficiently capital intensive consumption good sector to compen-
sate for the degree of decreasing returns, and a large enough elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption. Second, and this is our main
result, building on the same kind of restrictions for technologies and prefer-
ences, we prove the existence of configurations in which market integration
leads to aggregate instability and endogenous fluctuations. Our main focus
is a situation in which the closed-economy equilibrium of both countries is
saddle-point stable and the reform, which consists of joining a common mar-
ket for the consumption good and capital, leads to persistent endogenous
cycles at the world level. It follows that international trade can promote
aggregate instability. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to show that,
in a non-HOS international trade model, opening to free-trade can have a
global destabilizing effect on all trading partners.
7General production functions could be considered without altering significantly our
results.
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Although our paper is mainly theoretical, it is worthwhile looking at em-
pirical evidence. Building on some earlier studies by Easterly et al. [14] and
Kose et al. [21], di Giovanni and Levchenko [12] have recently investigated in
detail the relationship between trade openness and macroeconomic volatility
using industry-level data. They clearly show that countries that trade more
tend to be more volatile. This positive relationship indeed appears to be
economically significant, even after controlling for the size of both countries
and sectors using fixed effects. Building on the extreme comparison of the
closed-economy and free-trade equilibria of two countries, we provide here a
theoretical explanation of this empirical fact based on asymmetric technolo-
gies across countries and decreasing returns at the industry level.8 This last
non-standard assumption also appears to be empirically relevant. Indeed,
using disaggregated US data, a number of empirical studies have shown that,
while returns to scale appear to be roughly constant at the aggregate level,
significantly decreasing returns cannot be rejected at the industry level.9
The present paper is related to Nishimura, Venditti and Yano [24, 25] and
Ghiglino and Venditti [17]. In the first two papers, endogenous fluctuations
are shown to occur in a similar model after a trade-agreement provided
one of the two countries is characterized by persistent fluctuations in the
closed-economy case. However, the authors do not address the issue of the
global destabilizing effect of a common market. Another difference is that
preferences are bound to be linear. Ghiglino and Venditti [17] consider a
model like ours but with heterogeneous consumers instead of heterogeneous
countries. Altough the framework is similar, they focus on a different ques-
tion. The point is indeed to show that the distribution of capital shares
matters in the stability properties of the steady state and that an increase
of inequalities across agents may generate endogenous fluctuations. Such
a correlation requires non standard utility functions with a strictly convex
absolute risk tolerance and does not occur when the preferences are CIES.
In the current paper, we focus instead on the consequences of international
trade on the existence of endogenous fluctuations without considering any
wealth inequalities across countries.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is introduced.
8See also di Giovanni and Levchenko [13] for another theoretical explanation based on
country size and firms heterogeneity.
9See Basu and Fernald [3], Burnside [9] and Burnside et al. [10].
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Section 3 discusses the stability properties of the steady-state in a closed
economy while Section 4 analyzes the effects of market integration on the
occurrence of endogenous fluctuations. Section 5 concludes and the appendix
contains all of the proofs.
2 The model
We consider an infinite horizon perfect foresight dynamic general equilibrium
model with two countries, A and B, two factors, capital and labor, and two
goods, consumption and investment. For the description of the model in
the current Section and the analysis of the closed-economy equilibrium in
the following Section we do not consider explicitly any particular notation
for each country A and B. However, each time the two countries will be
simultaneously considered within the free-trade equilibrium, all the symbols
will be affected by a superscript A or B.
2.1 The production side
The pure consumption good, c, and the pure capital good, k are produced
from capital and labor with a Cobb-Douglas technology. We denote by x
and y the output of sectors c and k:
x = EcKα1c Lα2c , y = EyKβ1y Lβ2y
with Ec, Ey > 0 some normalization constants which will be used to modify
the comparative advantages of the countries. We assume decreasing returns
to scale in both sectors, i.e. β1 + β2 ≤ 1 and α1 + α2 ≤ 1.10 Labor is
normalized to one, Lc + Ly = 1, and the total stock of capital in country i
is given by Kc+Ky = k. Moreover in order to simplify the analysis, we also
assume that capital fully depreciates at each period.11 Goods c and k are
10A possible interpretation of decreasing returns is to assume the existence of a factor
in fixed supply such as land in the technology, namely
x = EcKα1c Lα2c L1−α1−α2c , y = EyKβ1y Lβ2y L1−β1−β2y
Returns to scale are therefore constant when considering this factor but decreasing with
respect to capital and labor. In such a case, the income of the representative consumer is
increased by the rental rate of land. Our formulation implicitly assumes a normalization
Lc = Ly = 1.
11See Baierl, Nishimura and Yano [1] for the dynamic analysis of a two-sector closed
economy with partial depreciation.
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assumed to be freely mobile between countries once trade opens, whereas
labor is internationally immobile both before and after the openning of trade.
In each country, the optimal allocation of factors across sectors is ob-
tained by solving the following program:
max
Kc,Lc,Ky ,Ly
EcKα1c Lα2c
s.t. y = EyKβ1y Lβ2y , 1 = Lc + Ly and k = Kc +Ky
(1)
Denote by qt, pt, ωt and rt respectively the prices of the consumption
good and the capital good, the wage rate of labor and the rental rate of
the capital good at time t. In free-trade equilibrium, qAt = q
B
t , p
A
t = p
B
t
and rAt = r
B
t must hold. On the contrary, because labor is immobile across
countries, ωt may differ between countries even in the free-trade case. In
the following we will choose the consumption good as numeraire and thus
adopt the normalization qAt = q
B
t = 1.
For any (kt, yt), solving the first order conditions derived from program
(1) gives inputs Kc, Lc, Ky and Ly as C2 functions of (kt, yt), i.e. Kˆc(kt, yt),
Lˆc(kt, yt), Kˆy(kt, yt) and Lˆy(kt, yt). We thus define the social production
function as:
T (kt, yt) = EcKˆc(kt, yt)α1Lˆc(kt, yt)α2 (2)
Using the envelope theorem we derive the equilibrium prices:
rt = T1(kt, yt), pt = −T2(kt, yt) (3)
where T1 = ∂T/∂k and T2 = ∂T/∂y.
2.2 The consumption side
Each country is characterized by an infinitely-lived representative agent with
single period CIES utility function given by
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ
with c the consumption level and σ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption. We assume that the labor
supply is inelastic.
Along a closed-economy equilibrium, the representative agent maximizes
an infinite stream of discounted utilities subject to the market clearing con-
ditions:
ct = xt, kt+1 = yt (4)
Along a free-trade equilibrium, i.e. in an open economy, as the consumption
and capital goods are assumed to be freely mobile between countries once
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trade opens, the central planner maximizes a weighted sum of each country’s
discounted utilities subject to the following market clearing conditions:
cAt + c
B
t = x
A
t + x
B
t , k
A
t+1 + k
B
t+1 = y
A
t + y
B
t (5)
Since the technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale, the competitive
firms earn positive profits that have to be distributed back to the households
who own physical capital. It can be shown that, with an identical CIES util-
ity function in both countries, solving a planning problem in which the plan-
ner maximizes the discounted sum of utilities, under free-trade (as shown by
Proposition 3)12 or in the closed-economy case, subject to the social produc-
tion function (2) for each country and the market clearing conditions (4) or
(5), is equivalent to solving a decentralized problem in which the households
maximize a discounted sum of utilitites subject to some budget constraint
based on given sequences of prices and the distributed profits.
3 Closed-economy equilibrium
In a closed economy the equilibrium is derived from the following optimiza-
tion program:
max
yt
+∞∑
t=0
ρt
T (kt, yt)1−σ
1− σ
s.t. kt+1 = yt, k0 given
with ρ ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor. The corresponding Euler equation is(
ct+1
ct
)σ
= −ρT1(kt+1,kt+2)T2(kt,kt+1) (6)
A closed-economy steady state is defined by ct = ct+1, kt = kt+1 = yt = k¯
and is obtained by solving −T1(k, k)/T2(k, k) = 1/ρ.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique closed-economy steady state k¯ > 0.
Note that the stationary closed-economy consumption level is given by
c¯ = c(k¯, k¯) = T (k¯, k¯) (7)
As usual with Cobb-Douglas technologies, factor intensities are deter-
mined by the exponents of the functions: The investment (consumption)
12See also Appendix 6.5 for additional details.
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good sector of country i is capital intensive if and only if β1/β2 > (<)α1/α2.
Building on the contribution of Benhabib and Nishimura [6], we know that
the existence of endogenous fluctuations requires a negative cross derivative
T12(k¯, k¯). This property can be obtained when the following assumption is
satisfied:13
Assumption 1. The consumption good sector of country i is capital inten-
sive with
α1β2 − α2β1 > α1β2(1−α1−α2)(1−α1)(1−β1) (8)
Note that with respect to the case with constant returns to scale studied
by Benhabib and Nishimura [6], we need here a sufficiently capital intensive
consumption good sector to compensate for the degree of decreasing returns.
Linearizing the Euler equation (6) around k¯ gives the characteristic poly-
nomial
Pc(x) = x2 − Tc(σ)x+Dc = 0 (9)
with Dc = ρ−1.14 The local stability analysis is performed using a simplified
version of the geometrical method provided by Grandmont, Pintus and de
Vilder [18]. It is based on a particular property characterizing the product
(Dc) and the sum (Tc) of characteristic roots. While Tc(σ) is a function of
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption σ,
Dc is constant for any σ ≥ 0. Considering the (Tc,Dc) plane, it follows that
for a given ρ ∈ (0, 1), when σ covers the interval [0,+∞), Tc(σ) varies along
an horizontal line, called in what follows ∆c. The starting point of ∆c is
obtained when σ = 0, and under Assumption 1 we get Tc(0) < 0. The end
point is obtained when σ = +∞ and is characterized by Tc(+∞) = 1+ρ−1 ≥
2. We get in this case
1− Tc(+∞) + ρ−1 = 0 (10)
Based on these results, in order to locate the line ∆c we finally need to study
how Tc(σ) varies with σ. Lemma 6.3 in Appendix 6.3 exhibits a critical
value σ∗c > 0 such that starting from (Tc(0), 1/ρ), when σ increases, the
point (Tc(σ), 1/ρ) decreases along the ∆c line as σ ∈ (0, σ∗c ), goes through
−∞ when σ = σ∗c and finally decreases from +∞ as σ > σ∗c until it reaches
the end point ((1 + ρ)/ρ, 1/ρ) which is located on the line defined by (10).
From all this, we easily conclude that the occurrence of period-two cycles
13See Lemma 6.2 in Appendix 6.2.
14Details are given in Appendix 6.2.
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through the existence of a flip bifurcation can be obtained if and only if the
starting point (Tc(0), 1/ρ) satisfies
1 + Tc(0) + ρ−1 > 0 (11)
In such a case indeed, the ∆c line is located as on the following Figure:
6
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σ¯c
Figure 1: Flip bifurcation of closed-economy equilibrium.
Inequality (11) is satisfied if ρ is sufficiently lower than 1 and if the following
assumption holds:
Assumption 2. The capital share of country i satisfies
α1 >
1+β1
2(β1+β2)
(12)
It is worth noting that Assumptions 1 and 2 are independent as none of them
implies or is a consequence of the other. We derive therefore the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exist ρ¯c ∈ (0, 1) and
σ¯c ∈ (0, σ∗c ) such that for any given ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯c), the closed-economy steady-
state k¯ is saddle-point stable when σ ∈ (σ¯c,+∞), undergoes a flip bifurcation
when σ crosses σ¯c from above and becomes locally unstable when σ ∈ [0, σ¯c).
Moreover there generically exist saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-
two cycles in a left (right) neighbourhood of σ¯c.
It is worth noting that if Assumption 2 does not hold or if ρ ∈ (ρ¯c, 1),
inequality (11) is not satisfied and the closed-economy steady-state is saddle-
point stable for all σ ≥ 0.15 However, damped fluctuations exist when σ ∈
[0, σ∗c ) as both characteristic roots are negative while monotone convergence
holds when σ > σ∗c .16 Graphically we obtain the following Figure:
15We get in this case σ¯c < 0.
16If Assumption 1 does not hold, the closed-economy steady-state is saddle-point stable
with monotone convergence. Indeed, σ∗c becomes negative and the ∆c line is only defined
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Figure 2: Oscillating/monotone convergence of closed-economy equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 2 can be summarized as follows. Consider
an instantaneous increase in the capital stock kt. This results in two oppos-
ing forces:
- Since the consumption good is more capital intensive than the in-
vestment good, the trade-off in production becomes more favorable to the
consumption good. The Rybczinsky theorem thus implies a decrease of the
output of the capital good yt. This tends to lower the investment and the
capital stock in the next period kt+1.
- In the next period the decrease of kt+1 implies again through the Ry-
bczinsky effect an increase of the output of the capital good yt+1. Indeed,
the decrease of kt+1 improves the trade-off in production in favor of the
investment good which is relatively less intensive in capital. Therefore this
tends to increase the investment and the capital stock in period t+2, kt+2.17
This mechanism requires a sufficiently capital intensive consumption good
sector to compensate for the degree of decreasing returns and a large enough
share of capital in the consumption good sector.
However the properties of preference also matter. The existence of persis-
tent cycles requires first that the agents accept fluctuations in their consump-
in the positive orthant.
17The restriction on the capital intensity difference across sectors is compatible with
recent empirical evidence. Building on aggregate Input-Output tables, Takahashi et al.
[30] have shown that over the last 30 years the OECD countries have been characterized
by a consumption good sector that is more capital-intensive than the investment good
sector. See also Baxter [4] for similar results.
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tion levels. This requires that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption 1/σ is large enough. But endogenous fluctuations require
also that the oscillations in relative prices must not present intertemporal
arbitrage opportunities. For instance, possible gains from postponing con-
sumption from periods when the marginal rate of transformation between
consumption and investment is high to periods when it is low must not be
worth it. This configuration is obtained provided that the discount factor ρ
is low enough.
It is worth noting at this point that, based on similar mechanisms, more
complex behavior of optimal paths, i.e. periodic cycles of any period or even
chaos in two-sector models,18 and Hopf bifurcations in n-sector models with
n ≥ 3,19 may occur. Our results are therefore compatible with more realistic
aggregate fluctuations.
4 Free-trade equilibrium
Assume there exists a free-trade equilibrium for this economy. Denote by
λi, i = A,B, the country i’s marginal utility of wealth associated with the
free-trade equilibrium. Given λ = (λA, λB), let us define the following social
welfare function
W (kt, yt;λ) = max
cAt ,c
B
t ,k
A
t ,k
B
t ,y
A
t ,y
B
t
1
λA
(cAt )
1−σ
(1−σ) +
1
λB
(cBt )
1−σ
(1−σ)
s.t. cAt + c
B
t ≤ TA(kAt , yAt ) + TB(kBt , yBt )
kAt + k
B
t ≤ kt and yAt + yBt ≤ yt
(13)
On the one hand, the first welfare theorem allows to use this social plan-
ner’s problem to solve for equilibrium. On the other hand, the Negishi [23]
approach states that in an economy with heterogeneous agents, the set of
Pareto allocations can be obtained by solving a social planner’s problem with
a utility function as given by (13). The competitive equilibrium is, then, the
Pareto optimal allocation obtained using the “right” set of weights. How-
ever, under the assumption of CIES utility functions which are identical
across the two countries, we can show that the free-trade allocation does
not depend on the particular values of the weights (since certain marginal
rates of substitution need to be equalized across countries).
18See for instance Boldrin and Montrucchio [8] and more recently Yano [39].
19See Benhabib and Nishimura [5], Venditti [31].
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Proposition 3. An equilibrium aggregate consumption path under free-
trade, ct, is determined in such a way that it may solve the following maxi-
mization problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
ρt(ct)1−σ (14)
s.t. ct ≤ TA(kAt , yAt ) + TB(kBt , yBt ) (15)
kAt + k
B
t ≤ kt (16)
yAt + y
B
t ≥ yt (17)
kt+1 = yt (18)
k0 = kA0 + k
B
0 given (19)
Once the aggregate consumption path, ct, is determined, the two countries’
consumption paths, cAt and c
B
t , are given by
(cAt , c
B
t ) =
(
(1/λA)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
ct,
(1/λB)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
ct
)
. (20)
This Proposition shows that an equilibrium aggregate consumption path
under free-trade, ct, is obtained independently of the marginal utilities of
wealth of countries A and B, λA and λB, in that equilibrium. Once the ag-
gregate consumption path, ct, is determined, the two countries’ consumption
paths, cAt and c
B
t , are derived in such a way that the aggregate consumption
good may be devided proportionately to
(1/λA)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
and (
1/λB)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
.
The first order conditions corresponding to the optimization program
(14) give:
cσt
[
TA1 (k
A
t , y
A
t )− TB1 (kBt , yBt )
]
= 0 = cσt
[
TA2 (k
A
t , y
A
t )− TB2 (kBt , yBt )
]
(21)
with ct = cAt + c
B
t . Solving these equations gives k
i
t = k
i(kt, yt) and yit =
yi(kt, yt) for i = A,B, and we get
V (kt, yt) = c1−σt =
[
TA(kA(kt, yt), yA(kt, yt)) + TB(kB(kt, yt), yB(kt, yt))
]1−σ
The social planner problem is then equivalent to maximizing a discounted
value of the period function V (kt, yt), and a free-trade equilibrium can then
be obtained as an equilibrium path derived from the following optimization:
12
max
yt
+∞∑
t=0
ρtV (kt, yt)
s.t. kt+1 = yt, k0 = kA0 + k
B
0 given
From the first order conditions (21) and the envelope theorem we get the
Euler equation (
ct+1
ct
)σ
= −ρTB1 (kB(kt+1,kt+2),yB(kt+1,kt+2))
TB2 (k
B(kt,kt+1),yB(kt,kt+1))
= −ρTA1 (kA(kt+1,kt+2),yA(kt+1,kt+2))
TA2 (k
A(kt,kt+1),yA(kt,kt+1))
(22)
Let us denote k∗ the solution of
−TB1 (kB(k∗,k∗),yB(k∗,k∗))
TB2 (k
B(k∗,k∗),yB(k∗,k∗)) =
1
ρ = −
TA1 (k
A(k∗,k∗),yA(k∗,k∗))
TA2 (k
A(k∗,k∗),yA(k∗,k∗)) (23)
The steady-state k∗ gives the total stationary amount of capital at the world
level. The allocation of capital across the two countries has to be determined.
4.1 Stationary free-trade allocation
Let us denote by X ij , Mij and NX i respectively the exports and imports
of good j = c, y, and the balance of trade for country i = A,B. We focus
on a free-trade allocation k∗ = kA∗ + kB∗ in which one country, say A, is
characterized by net imports of capital, i.e. kA∗ > yA∗, while country B
is characterized by net exports of capital, i.e. kB∗ < yB∗. The associated
stationary consumption levels are then derived from the assumption that
the balance of trade is in equilibrium in each country, namely
NXA = XAc − pMAy = 0, NXB = pXBy −MBc = 0
and are such that country A is characterized by net exports of consumption,
i.e. cA∗ < TA∗, while country B is characterized by net imports of con-
sumption, i.e. cB∗ > TB∗. Let us consider a particular solution satisfying
a symmetry property such that kA∗ = θyA∗ > yA∗ and kB∗ = yB∗/θ < yB∗
with θ > 1 a given constant. In the rest of the paper, we will consider
economies with parameter values for which such an equilibrium exists. We
introduce the following restriction:
Assumption 3. αB1 + α
A
1 β
B
1 ≥ αA1 + αB1 βA1
Let us denote θ¯ = 1/ρβB1 . The following Proposition provides conditions for
the existence of this particular free-trade allocation:
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Proposition 4. Under Assumption 3, let EBc = EBy = 1 and consider a
constant θ ∈ (1, θ¯). The free-trade allocation k∗ = kA∗ + kB∗ with
kA∗ = θ
(
αA1 β
A
2
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
) βA2
1−βA1
[
EAy (ρβA1 )β
A
1 +β
A
2
] 1
1−βA1 = θyA∗
kB∗ =
(
αB1 β
B
2
αB2 β
B
1 +(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ
) βB2
1−βB1
[
(ρβB1 θ)
βB1 +β
B
2
θ
] 1
1−βB1 = yB∗/θ
(24)
is a solution of equation (23) if and only if EAc = EA∗c and EAy = EA∗y with
EA∗c = [
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 ]
αA2 αB1 (α
B
2 β
B
1 )
αB2 (1−ρβB1 θ)α
B
1 +α
B
2 −1(kB∗)α
B
1 −αA1
αA1 (α
A
2 β
A
1 )
αA2 (θ−ρβA1 )α
A
1 +α
A
2 −1[αB2 βB1 +(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ]
αB2
EA∗y =
„
αB1 β
B
2
αB2 β
B
1 +(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ
«βB2 (1−βA1 )
1−βB1
(ρβA1 )
βA1 +β
A
2
„
αA1 β
A
2
αA2 β
A
1 θ+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
«βA2
[
(ρβB1 θ)
βB1 +β
B
2
θ
] 1−βA1
1−βB1
(25)
Moreover, the associated free-trade allocation of consumption is such that
cA∗ = TB∗ and cB∗ = TA∗.
Proposition 4 shows that by changing the constants EAc and EAy , we can
construct economies satisfying the symmetry property for different values of
θ ∈ (1, θ¯).
4.2 Endogenous fluctuations under free-trade
We focus on local stability results when the consumption good is sufficiently
capital intensive to compensate for the degree of decreasing returns. As in
the closed-economy case, such a capital intensity configuration is associated
with endogenous fluctuations. We introduce the following restrictions along
the free-trade allocation:
Assumption 4. In countries A and B, the consumption good is capital
intensive with
αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > α
A
1 β
A
2 θ(1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(θ−βA1 )
(26)
and
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > α
B
1 β
B
2 (1−αB1 −αB2 )
(1−αB1 )(1−θβB1 )
(27)
Linearizing the Euler equation (22) around k∗ gives the characteristic
polynomial
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Pf (x) = x2 − Tf (σ)x+Df = 0 (28)
with Df = ρ−1.20 As in the closed-economy case, the local stability analysis
is performed using the fact that while Tf (σ) is a function of the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption σ, Df is constant
for any σ ≥ 0. Based on Proposition 3, our methodology allows again to
apply the geometrical method of Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder [18] to
the local stability analysis of a two-country general equilibrium trade model.
Proceeding as in Section 3, we easily conclude that the occurrence of period-
two cycles through the existence of a flip bifurcation can be obtained if and
only if the starting point (Tf (0), 1/ρ) satisfies
1 + Tf (0) + ρ−1 > 0 (29)
Inequality (29) is satisfied if ρ is sufficiently lower than 1 and if the following
assumption holds:
Assumption 5. The capital shares of countries A and B satisfy
αA1 >
θ(1−βA1 −βA2 )+2βA1 +βA2
2(βA1 +β
A
2 )
(30)
and
αB1 >
1−βB1 −βB2 +θ(2βB1 +βB2 )
2θ(βB1 +β
B
2 )
(31)
We derive therefore the following Proposition:
Proposition 5. Let θ ∈ (1, θ¯). Under Assumptions 3-5, there exist ρ¯f ∈
(0, 1) and σ¯f ∈ (0, σ∗f ) such that for any given ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ), the free-trade
steady-state k∗ is saddle-point stable when σ ∈ (σ¯f ,+∞), undergoes a flip
bifurcation when σ crosses σ¯f from above, and becomes locally unstable when
σ ∈ [0, σ¯f ). Moreover, the optimal path at the world level is generically
characterized by saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles in a
left (right) neighbourhood of σ¯f .
Proposition 5 provides conditions on the technologies of both countries
for the existence of endogenous fluctuations at the free-trade steady-state
which are similar to those given in Proposition 2. As our result imposes
a lot of conditions on the parameters, one may wonder whether there
exists a non empty set of parameters satisfying these conditions. The
20Details are given in Appendix 6.7.
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following numerical illustration allows to prove the non-emptiness of this set.
Example: Let us consider the following parameters’ values: αA1 = 0.66,
αA2 = 0.33, β
A
1 = 0.3, β
A
2 = 0.69, α
B
1 = 0.67, α
B
2 = 0.32, β
B
1 = 0.31,
βB2 = 0.68. When θ ∈ (1, 1.67), Assumptions 3-5 hold with these values.
Proposition 5 shows that the sets of parameters values for which the
closed economies and the free-trade economies have cycles are not the same,
and therefore, the long run equilibrium behavior of the free-trade economy
may be different from the equilibrium behavior of each of the economies in
isolation. As a result, we derive the following two Theorems which are the
first main results of the paper, and which prove that endogenous periodic
cycles can occur at the world level in two different circumstances. It is
worth noting that in the following, in order to compare the equilibria of
the closed and free-trade economies, the closed-economy steady state refers
to the steady state of the closed economy i with the same technological
parameters E ic and E iy as the free-trade economy.
Theorem 1. Let θ ∈ (1, θ¯) and Assumption 3 hold. Assume that in country
A, (30) in Assumption 5 holds, and, for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1),
αA1 β
A
2 (1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(1−ρβA1 )
> αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > α
A
1 β
A
2 θ(1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )
(32)
If in country B, (27) in Assumption 4 holds and
αB1 >
1+βB1
2(βB1 +β
B
2 )
(33)
then there exist ρ¯f ∈ (0, 1) and σ¯f ∈ (0, σ∗f ) such that for any given
ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ), the optimal path at the world level is generically characterized
by saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles in a left (right)
neighbourhood of σ¯f , while the closed-economy steady-state in economy A
is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence for any σ ≥ 0. Business
cycle fluctuations then translate across national boundaries as in economy
B there generically exist period-two cycles in a neighborhood of σ¯Bc .
For a given value of θ ∈ (1, θ¯), and thus given values of the technol-
ogy parameters, Theorem 1 proves that endogenous fluctuations arise under
free-trade while the capital importing country A is characterized by a saddle-
point stable closed-economy steady-state with monotone convergence. How-
ever, the closed-economy equilibrium in country B is also characterized by
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period-two cycles. International globalization and market integration then
generate a contagion of the capital exporting country’s endogenous fluctua-
tions and have a destabilizing effect on the capital importing country. Note
that decreasing returns in the consumption good sector of country A are
necessary for this international transmission of cycles since condition (32)
cannot hold if 1 − αA1 − αA2 = 0. The Assumption 1 − αA1 − αA2 > 0 means
that our result requires large enough decreasing returns in the consumption
good of country A.
Theorem 2. Let θ ∈ (1, θ¯) and Assumption 3 hold. Assume that in country
A, (30) in Assumption 5 holds, and, for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1),
αA1 β
A
2 (1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(1−ρβA1 )
> αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > α
A
1 β
A
2 θ(1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )
(34)
If in country B, (27) in Assumption 4 holds and
1+βB1
2(βB1 +β
B
2 )
> αB1 >
1−βB1 −βB2 +θ(2βB1 +βB2 )
2θ(βB1 +β
B
2 )
(35)
then there exist ρ¯f ∈ (0, 1) and σ¯f ∈ (0, σ∗f ) such that for any given
ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ), the optimal path at the world level is generically characterized
by saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles in a left (right)
neighbourhood of σ¯f , while the closed-economy steady-state in economy A
is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence for any σ ≥ 0. Opening
to free-trade then creates persistent business cycle fluctuations as the closed-
economy steady state in economy B is also saddle-point stable for any σ ≥ 0.
Theorem 2 proves that endogenous fluctuations arise under free-trade
even though saddle-point stability holds in both closed-economy countries.
Now, international globalization and market integration create new oppor-
tunities for periodic cycles, and have a global destabilizing effect on all the
trading countries. Note here that decreasing returns in the investment good
sector of country B are also necessary for this global destabilizing effect
since condition (35) cannot hold if 1 − βB1 − βB2 = 0. The Assumption
1−βB1 −βB2 > 0 means that our result also requires large enough decreasing
returns in the capital good of country B.
The intuition for the existence of persistent fluctuations at the world level
is of course similar to the one derived in a closed economy. As suggested by
Proposition 5, we need a sufficiently capital intensive aggregate consumption
good sector and a large enough share of capital in the aggregate consumption
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good sector to generate oscillations of the capital stock on the production
side, a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution to allow the
consumers accepting fluctuations in consumption, and a low enough discount
factor to prevent intertemporal arbitrage opportunities. However, now the
equilibrium is defined from the free-trade allocation across countries. As
a result, the technological conditions may be less restrictive than in the
closed-economy case.
Indeed, for country A which imports capital, the consumption good sec-
tor needs to be less capital intensive at the free-trade equilibrium than at the
closed-economy equilibrium. This condition can then be satisfied while at
the same time the consumption good sector in the closed-economy country
A is not sufficiently capital intensive to generate oscillations of the capital
stock. Moreover, for country B which exports capital, the share of capital
in the consumption good sector needs to be lower at the free-trade equilib-
rium than at the closed-economy equilibrium. As a result this condition can
be satisfied while at the same time in the consumption good sector of the
closed-economy country B, the share of capital is not sufficiently large to
generate persistent fluctuations of the capital stock.
In order to understand the transition between the closed-economy
equilibrium and the free-trade equilibrium, assume that both countries are
initially at their respective closed-economy steady state. When the countries
open up to international trade, the new steady states are characterized by
imports of capital good but exports of consumption good in country A,
and conversely for country B. When saddle-point stable cycles occur at
the free-trade equilibrium, each country will jump on the saddle-path that
converges towards the period-two cycles.
Example: The following numerical illustration allows to prove the
non-emptiness of the set of parameters satisfying the conditions of Theorem
2. Let us consider the parameters’ values: αA1 = 0.65, α
A
2 = 0.11, β
A
1 = 0.28,
βA2 = 0.72, α
B
1 = 0.79, α
B
2 = 0.20, β
B
1 = 0.25, β
B
2 = 0.5. All the conditions
of Theorem 1 are satisfied when θ = 2.5, and the closed-economy steady
state is saddle-point stable in both countries while international trade
generates a global destabilizing effect at the world level.
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It is important to note here that our results fundamentaly rely on the fact
that we depart from the standard HOS framework in which the technologies
are symmetric across countries. In this case indeed we have EAc = EBc ,
EAy = EBy , αAi = αBi and βAi = βBi , i = 1, 2, the free-trade stationary
allocation is identical to the closed-economy steady-state so that there is no
trade in the long-run, and Assumptions 4 and 5 imply Assumptions 1 and
2. As a result, persistent cycles at the world level are obtained provided
persistent cycles also exist in the two closed economies.
Based on a similar argument, this property also explains why decreasing
returns are also fundamental to get a destabilization effect of international
trade. If we assume that the production functions are all linearly homo-
geneous, the production side of our model is a special case of the HOS
model with freely internationally mobile capital. In the static context, this
model was originally studied by Kemp [20] and Jones [19]. In the dynamic
context, it was studied by Nishimura and Yano [27]. An important feature
of this model is that, in general, one country completely specializes in one
sector while the other country tends to be incompletely specialized. In such
a framework, international trade does not modify the dynamic properties
of the equilibrium with respect to the closed-economy case.
Theorems 1 and 2 show that opening to free-trade can have a destabiliz-
ing effect on both partner countries. However, it is important to note that
under different conditions, opening to free-trade could also have a stabilizing
effect. We derive indeed from Theorems 1 and 2:
Theorem 3. Let θ ∈ (1, θ¯) and Assumption 3 hold. Assume that in country
A, Assumption 1 holds with
θ(1−βA1 −βA2 )+2βA1 +βA2
2(βA1 +β
A
2 )
> αA1 >
1+βA1
2(βA1 +β
A
2 )
(36)
and in country B, Assumption 2 holds with
αB1 β
B
2 (1−αB1 −αB2 )
(1−αB1 )(1−ρβB1 θ)
> αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > α
B
1 β
B
2 (1−αB1 −αB2 )
(1−αB1 )(1−ρβB1 )
(37)
for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1), then both countries are characterized by the possible
existence of period-two cycles in the closed-economy case, while saddle-point
stability always holds at the world level.
Theorem 3 shows that there also exist technological configurations under
which countries that would have cycles when closed experience a stable
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steady state under free-trade.
To confirm that opening to free-trade can have a destabilizing effect on
both trading countries, we may now focus on the impact of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution 1/σ on the existence of business cycle fluctuations
at the world level. To simplify the formulation, let us assume that the
returns to scale are constant in the consumption good sector of country B,
i.e. 1 − αB1 − αB2 = 0, and let us slightly modify Assumptions 4 and 5 as
follows:
Assumption 6. In countries A and B, the consumption good is capital
intensive with
αA1 β
A
2 (1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(1−ρβA1 )
> αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 > α
A
1 β
A
2 θ(1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )
for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 7. The capital shares of countries A and B satisfy
αA1 >
θ(1−βA1 −βA2 )+2βA1 +βA2
2(βA1 +β
A
2 )
and
αB1 ∈
(
1−βB1 −βB2 +θ(2βB1 +βB2 )
2θ(βB1 +β
B
2 )
,
3+βB1
4
)
(38)
Assumptions 6 still implies that in the closed economy A, the optimal path
monotonically converges toward the closed-economy steady-state for any
σ ≥ 0. The modified condition (38) in Assumption 7 leads to a positive
flip bifurcation value σ¯Bc for country B in the closed-economy case so that
the closed-economy steady-state is saddle-point stable for any σ > σ¯Bc . The
following Theorem, which is the second main result of the paper, shows that
σ¯Bc may be as small as possible.
Theorem 4. Let θ ∈ (1, θ¯), 1− αB1 − αB2 = 0 and Assumptions 3, 6 and 7
hold. There exist  > 0, ρ¯f ∈ (0, 1) and σ¯f > σ¯Bc > 0 such that if
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 ∈
(
(1−βB1 )αB2
2+ρ(1+βB1 )−2(1+ρ)αB1
,
(1−βB1 )αB2
2+ρ(1+βB1 )−2(1+ρ)αB1
+ 
)
,
then for any given ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ), the optimal path at the world level is generi-
cally characterized by saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles
in a left (right) neighbourhood of σ¯f , while the closed-economy steady-state
is saddle-point stable for any σ > σ¯Bc in both economies. Persistent endoge-
nous fluctuations at the world level occur for lower values of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption than in a closed economy.
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This Theorem shows that for a given elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion in consumption such that σ > σ¯Bc for which the autarky steady state
is saddle-point stable in both countries, international trade and market in-
tegration can again create new opportunities for aggregate fluctuations by
generating endogenous cycles at the world level when σ is in a left neigh-
bourhood of σ¯f , i.e. with a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption.
5 Concluding comments
In a perfect foresight model with two countries characterized by Cobb-
Douglas technologies with decreasing returns and CIES non-linear prefer-
ences, we have investigated the way endogenous fluctuations may spread all
over the world through international trade. Our main result shows that even
in a situation in which the closed-economy equilibrium of both countries is
saddle-point stable, a trade reform, which consists of joining a common mar-
ket for the consumption good and capital, can lead to persistent endogenous
cycles at the world level. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to show
that, in a non-HOS international trade model, opening to free-trade can
have a global destabilizing effect on all trading partners.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We start by characterizing the first partial derivatives of the social produc-
tion function.
Lemma 6.1. The first partial derivatives of T (k, y) are given by:
T1(k, y) = Ecα1(α2β1/∆)α2(k − g)α1+α2−1
T2(k, y) = −T1(k,y)Eyβ1 (α1β2/∆)−β2g1−β1−β2
where
∆ = α2β1k + (α1β2 − α2β1)g
g = g(k, y) =
{
Ky ∈ [0, k] such that y = Ey(α1β2)
β2K
β1+β2
y
[α2β1k+(α1β2−α2β1)Ky ]β2
}
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Proof : The Lagrangean corresponding to program (1) is:
Lt = EcKα1ct Lα2ct + pt
(
EyKβ1yt Lβ2yt − yt
)
+ ωt(1− Lct − Lyt) + rt(kt −Kct −Kyt)
(39)
The first order conditions are such that:
Ecα1Kα1−1c Lα2c − r = 0, Ecα2Kα1c Lα2−1c − ω = 0 (40)
Eypβ1Kβ1−1y Lβ2y − r = 0, Eypβ2Kβ1y Lβ2−1y − ω = 0 (41)
Using Kc = k −Ky, Ly = 1− Lc, and merging (40)-(41) we obtain:
Lc =
α2β1(k −Ky)
(α1β2 − α2β1)Ky + α2β1k (42)
Ly =
α1β2Ky
(α1β2 − α2β1)Ky + α2β1k (43)
Kc = k −Ky (44)
Ky = g(k, y) ≡ g (45)
where
g(k, y) =
{
Ky ∈ [0, k] such that y = Ey(α1β2)
β2K
β1+β2
y
[α2β1k+(α1β2−α2β1)Ky ]β2
}
(46)
To simplify notation let:
∆ = α2β1k + (α1β2 − α2β1)g (47)
From (40), (42) and (44) we obtain:
T1(k, y) = r = Ecα1(k − g)α1+α2−1(α2β1/∆)α2 (48)
and from (41), (43), (45) and (48):
−T2(k, y) = p = Ecα1Eyβ1
(α2β1/∆)α2
(α1β2/∆)β2
(k − g)α1+α2−1g1−β1−β2 (49)
From (48) and (49) we finally derive
T2(k, y) = −T1(k,y)Eyβ1 (α1β2/∆)−β2g1−β1−β2
We may now prove Proposition 1. Using (46) we derive
T2(k, y) = −T1(k, y) gyβ1 (50)
It follows that at the closed-economy steady-state K∗y ≡ g = ρβ1y = ρβ1k¯.
Solving T2(k, k) + ρT1(k, k) = 0 finally gives the expression of the steady-
state, namely
k¯ =
(
α1β2
α2β1+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1
) β2
1−β1 [Ey(ρβ1)β1+β2] 11−β1
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6.2 The characteristic polynomial in a closed economy
We start by characterizing the second partial derivatives of T (k, y):
Lemma 6.2. The second partial derivatives of T (k, y) are given by:
T11(k, y) =
T1(k,y)
k−g
{
[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)−α2β2](k−g)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2k
α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g
}
T12(k, y) =
T1(k,y)
k−g
g
yβ1
{−(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(k−g)+(1−α1−α2)α1β2k
α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g
}
T22(k, y) = −T1(k,y)k−g
(
g
yβ1
)2
×
{
(1−β1−β2)(k/g)α2β1(k−g)−(β1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(k−g)+(1−α1−α2)α1β2k
α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g
}
with |H(k, y)| ≡ T11(k, y)T22(k, y)− T12(k, y)2 > 0.
Proof : Recall that by definition of g we have the identity:
y[α2β1k + (α1β2 − α2β1)g]β2 = E iy(α1β2)β2gβ1+β2 (51)
Total differentiation gives after simplifications:
g
{
dy∆ + β2y[α2β1dk + (α1β2 − α2β1)dg]
}
= (β1 + β2)y∆dg
We then get
g1 = dgdk =
α2β2g
α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g
g2 = dgdy =
∆g
yβ1[α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g]
(52)
The second partial derivatives of T (k, y) are obtained by differentiating (48)
and (49):
T11(k, y) = − (1−α1−α2)(1−g1)T1(k,y)k−g − α2[α2β1+(α1β2−α2β1)g1]T1(k,y)∆
T12(k, y) =
(1−α1−α2)g2T1(k,y)
k−g − α2(α1β2−α2β1)g2T1(k,y)∆
T22(k, y) =
(1−α1−α2)g2T2(k,y)
k−g +
(1−β1−β2)g2T2(k,y)
g
+ (β2−α2)(α1β2−α2β1)g2T2(k,y)∆
The final expressions of these derivatives are obtained after simplifications
built on (50) and the fact that
g − kg1 = ∆gα2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g = yβ1g2
1− g1 = α2β2(k−g)+∆α2(β1+β2)k+(α1β2−α2β1)g
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Strict concavity of the production functions implies that the determinant
of the Hessian matrix of T (k, y) satisfies |H(k, y)| ≡ T11(k, y)T22(k, y) −
T12(k, y)2 > 0.
From (42), (44) and (47), we get
c = Ec(k − g)α1+α2
(
α2β1
∆
)α2
(53)
Consider the following notations
c1 = ∂c(k, y)/∂k, c2 = ∂c(k, y)/∂y
We easily derive from the envelope theorem
c1 = T1(k, y), c2 = T2(k, y) = −T1(k, y) gyβ1 (54)
Consider now the closed-economy steady-state with g = ρβ1y = ρβ1k¯. We
then have c2 = −ρT1(k, y) and total differenciation of equation (6) gives
dkt+2
[
1 + σρ T¯
2
1
c¯T¯12
]
+ dkt+1
[
T¯22
ρT¯12
+ T¯11
T¯12
− σ(1 + ρ) T¯ 21
c¯T¯12
]
+ dkt
[
1
ρ + σ
T¯ 21
c¯T¯12
]
= 0
with T¯1 = T1(k¯, k¯) and T¯jk = Tjk(k¯, k¯), j, k = 1, 2. Straightforward compu-
tations finally give the characteristic polynomial:
Pc(x) = x2 − Tc(σ)x+Dc = 0 (55)
with
Dc = 1ρ , Tc(σ) =
− T¯11
T¯12
− T¯22
ρT¯12
+σ(1+ρ)
T¯21
c¯T¯12
1+σρ
T¯21
c¯T¯12
(56)
and
T¯11
T¯12
≡ T11(k¯,k¯)
T12(k¯,k¯)
= −1ρ
[
1− α2β2(1−ρβ1)(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2
]
T¯22
ρT¯12
≡ T22(k¯,k¯)
ρT12(k¯,k¯)
= −1 + (1−ρβ1)[α2(1−β1−β2)+ρ(1−β1)(α1β2−α2β1)]ρ[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2]
T¯ 21
c¯T¯12
≡ T1(k¯,k¯)2
c¯T12(k¯,k¯)
= − α1[α2(β1+β2)+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1]ρ[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2]
The last expressions are obtained from substituting g = ρβ1y = ρβ1k¯ into
the second partial derivatives of T (k, y) given in Lemma 6.2.
6.3 The function Tc(σ)
Note first that under Assumption 1,
Tc(0) = − T¯11T¯12 −
T¯22
ρT¯12
< 0 and Tc(+∞) = 1 + ρ−1 ≥ 2 (57)
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Lemma 6.3. Under Assumption 1, there exists σ∗c ∈ (0,+∞) such
that Tc(σ) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in σ over [0, σ∗c ) ∪
(σ∗c ,+∞). Moreover, limσ→σ∗c− Tc(σ) = −∞ and limσ→σ∗c+ Tc(σ) = +∞.
Proof : Straightforward computations from (89) give
T ′c (σ) = T¯
2
1
c¯T¯12
1+ρ
“
1+
T¯11
T¯12
+
T¯22
ρT¯12
”
»
1+σρ
T¯∗21
c¯T¯12
–2
= −
α1[α2(β1+β2)+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1](1−ρβ1)(1−β1)[α2+ρ(α1β2−α2β1)]
ρ[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2]2»
1+σρ
T¯∗21
c¯T¯12
–2 < 0
(58)
Consider now the expressions of Tc(σ) and T¯ 21 /c¯T¯12 given in Appendix
6.2. We first derive that T¯12 < 0 and thus T¯ 21 /c¯T¯12 < 0 if and only if the
consumption good is capital intensive with
α1β2 − α2β1 > 1−α1−α21−α1
α1β2
1−ρβ1 (59)
As the right-hand-side is an increasing function of ρ, T¯ 21 /c¯T¯12 < 0 for any
ρ ∈ (0, 1) if
α1β2 − α2β1 > α1β2(1−α1−α2)(1−α1)(1−β1)
This gives Assumption 1. Under this condition, there exists a critical value
σ∗c as defined by
σ∗c = − c¯T¯12ρT¯ 21 =
(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2
α1[α2(β1+β2)+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1] (60)
such that the denominator of Tc(σ) is equal to zero when σ = σ∗c . Moreover,
when σ = σ∗c , the numerator of Tc(σ) is equal to
− T¯11
T¯12
− T¯22
ρT¯12
− 1+ρρ = − (1−ρβ1)(1−β1)[α2+ρ(α1β2−α2β1)]ρ[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2]
which is negative under Assumption 1. It follows that limσ→σ∗c− Tc(σ) = −∞
and limσ→σ∗c+ Tc(σ) = +∞.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Based on Figure 1, we only need to show that 1 + Tc(0) + 1/ρ > 0, i.e.
hc(ρ) =
(1+ρ)
ρ − T¯11T¯12 −
T¯22
ρT¯12
= 2(1+ρ)ρ − (1−ρβ1)(1−β1)[α2+ρ(α1β2−α2β1)]ρ[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2] > 0
Consider the second partial derivatives of T (k, y) evaluated at the closed-
economy steady-state given in Appendix 6.2. When ρ = 1, we have by
definition
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hc(1) = 2T¯12−T¯11−T¯22T¯12 = −
“
1 −1
”0@ T¯11 T¯12
T¯12 T¯22
1A0@ 1
−1
1A
T¯12
Under Assumption 1 we have T¯12 < 0 and thus hc(1) < 0. On the other side,
we get limρ→0 hc(ρ) = +∞ if and only if 2α1(β1 + β2) − 1 − β1 > 0. This
gives Assumption 2. Therefore, under this condition there exists ρ¯c ∈ (0, 1)
such that hc(ρ) > 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯c). We then conclude from Figure 1
that when ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯c), there exists σ¯c ∈ (0, σ∗c ) such that the closed-economy
steady-state k¯ is saddle-point stable for all σ ∈ (σ¯c,+∞). The existence
of period-two cycles when σ crosses σ¯c from above follows from the flip
bifurcation theorem. The bifurcation value σ¯c is obtained as the solution of
1 + Tc(σ) + 1/ρ = 0 and is equal to
σ¯c = −
1+ρ
ρ
− T¯11
T¯12
− T¯22
ρT¯12
2(1+ρ)
T¯21
c¯T¯12
= 2(1+ρ)[(1−α1)(α1β2−α2β1)(1−ρβ1)−(1−α1−α2)α1β2]2(1+ρ)α1[α2(β1+β2)+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1]
− (1−ρβ1)(1−β1)[α2+ρ(α1β2−α2β1)]2(1+ρ)α1[α2(β1+β2)+(α1β2−α2β1)ρβ1]
(61)
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
In a dynamic equilibrium, as is well known, a weighed sum of all consumers’
utilities is maximized over all feasible paths, and the weight attached to each
consumer’s utility is equal to the inverse of the marginal utility of wealth
(see Negishi [23], Bewley [7], and Yano [35] and [38]). This implies that
1
λA
∞∑
t=0
ρtuA(cAt ) +
1
λB
∞∑
t=0
ρtuB(cBt ) (62)
is maximized over all feasible path, that is to say, the following holds (see
Yano [35] and [38] for a proof).
Lemma 6.4. An equilibrium consumption path under free trade, (cAt , c
B
t ),
solves the following maximization problem:
max
[
1
λA
∞∑
t=0
ρtuA(cAt ) +
1
λB
∞∑
t=0
ρtuB(cBt )
]
(63)
s.t. cAt + c
B
t ≤ TA(kAt , yAt ) + TB(kBt , yBt ) (64)
kAt + k
B
t ≤ kt (65)
yAt + y
B
t ≥ yt (66)
for given k0.
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Since all resources are utilitized efficiently along an equilibrium, Lemma
6.4 implies that, in each period, the two countries’ consumption path (cAt , c
B
t )
maximizes
1
λA
(cAt )
1−σ
1−σ +
1
λB
(cBt )
1−σ
1−σ (67)
subject to
cAt + c
B
t = ct, (68)
given that ct is the world consumption path in equilibrium. Since we assume
uA(cA) = (c
A)1−σ
1−σ and u
B(cB) = (c
B)1−σ
1−σ , the Lagrangean associated with this
periodwise optimization problem can be, after dropping subscript t, written
as
L = 1
λA
(cA)1−σ
1−σ +
1
λB
(cB)1−σ
1−σ + γ(c
A + cB − c). (69)
From this, we obtain the FOC as follows:
1
λA
(
cA
)−σ = γ, (70)
1
λB
(
cB
)−σ = γ, (71)
and
cA + cB = c. (72)
This implies that
γσ = 1
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
c, (73)
cA = (
1/λA)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
c, (74)
and
cB = (
1/λB)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
c. (75)
By solving these expressions, we obtain
1
λA
uA(cA) + 1
λB
uB(cB) = µc1−σ, (76)
where
µ = 11−σ
(
1
λA
(
(1/λA)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
)1−σ
+ 1
λB
(
(1/λB)σ
(1/λA)σ+(1/λB)σ
)1−σ)
.
This implies that, under free trade, an equilibrium aggregate consumption
path maximizes
∞∑
t=0
ρt(ct)1−σ (77)
over all feasible aggregate consumption paths from k0. Once the aggregate
consumption path, ct, is determined, an equilibrium consumption path for
the countries, (cAt , c
B
t ), is determined by the above FOC. In other words, each
country’s consumption path depends on the marginal utilities of wealth, λA
and λB.
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
A steady-state is obtained as a solution (kA, kB, yA, yB, k) of the following
system
TA2 (k
A, yA) + ρTA1 (k
A, yA) = 0 (78)
TB2 (k
B, yB) + ρTB1 (k
B, yB) = 0 (79)
TA1 (k
A, yA)− TB1 (kB, yB) = 0 (80)
TA2 (k
A, yA)− TB2 (kB, yB) = 0 (81)
kA + kB = yA + yB = k (82)
with cA + cB = TA(kA, kA) + TB(kB, kB). We get from equations (78)-(79)
the following property for a steady-state under free-trade:
Lemma 6.5. At a steady-state under free-trade, the following relationship
holds: gA
yAβA1
= g
B
yBβB1
= ρ
Proof : The first order conditions (80)-(81) show that TAj (k
A, yA) =
TBj (k
B, yB), j = 1, 2. Since T2(k, y) = −T1(k, y)g/yβ1, we derive that
gA/yAβA1 = g
B/yBβB1 . Consider now the Euler equation (22) evaluated at
a steady-state under free-trade. We get −T2(k, y) = ρT1(k, y) and the result
follows.
We may now prove Proposition 4. Consider equations (78)-(82). We know
from Lemma 6.5 that equations (78) and (79) imply g = ρβ1y, i = A,B.
Assume then that kA = θyA and kB = yB/θ with θ > 1 some constant.
It follows from (82) that kA = θkB, yB = θyA and gA = ρβA1 k
A/θ, gB =
ρβB1 k
Bθ. Substituting these expressions into (46) with Ky = g and solving
for k, i = A,B, gives
kA∗ = θ
(
αA1 β
A
2
ΦAθ
) βA2
1−βA1
[
EAy (ρβA1 )β
A
1 +β
A
2
] 1
1−βA1
kB∗ =
(
αB1 β
B
2
ΦBθ
) βB2
1−βB1
[
EBy (ρβB1 θ)β
B
1 +β
B
2
θ
] 1
1−βB1
(83)
with
ΦAθ = α
A
2 β
A
1 θ + (α
A
1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 )ρβA1 and ΦBθ = αB2 βB1 + (αB1 βB2 − αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ
Assuming EBy = 1, we derive from (83) that kA∗ = θkB∗ if and only if
θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) and EAy = EA∗y with
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EA∗y = (
αB1 β
B
2 /Φ
B
θ )
βB2 (1−βA1 )
1−βB1
(ρβA1 )
βA1 +β
A
2 (αA1 βA2 /ΦAθ )
βA2
[
(ρβB1 θ)
βB1 +β
B
2
θ
] 1−βA1
1−βB1 (84)
Considering T1(k, y) in Lemma 6.1 with EBc = 1, equation (80) is satisfied if
and only if θ ∈ (1, 1/ρβB1 ) and EAc = EA∗c with
EA∗c = (Φ
A
θ )
αA2 αB1 (α
B
2 β
B
1 )
αB2 (1−ρβB1 θ)α
B
1 +α
B
2 −1(kB∗)α
B
1 −αA1
αA1 (α
A
2 β
A
1 )
αA2 (θ−ρβA1 )α
A
1 +α
A
2 −1(ΦBθ )
αB2
(85)
Then, since from (78) and (79) we have T1(k, y) = T2(k, y)/ρ, i = A,B,
equation (81) also holds.
Country i’s production of the consumption good is derived from (2) as
T i∗ = T (ki∗, ki∗). We know that country A imports capital goods while
country B exports capital goods: MAy = (θ − 1)yA∗ and XBy =
(
θ−1
θ
)
yB∗.
In order to have a balance of trade in equilibrium, country A has to export
consumption goods while country B has to import consumption goods. Let
η > 1 be such that
cA∗ = T
A∗
η < T
A∗, cB∗ = ηTB∗ > TB∗
It follows that
XAc =
(
η−1
η
)
TA∗, MBc = (η − 1)TB∗
Therefore, the balance of trade is in equilibrium in each country if NXA =
XAc − pMAy = 0 and NXB = pXBy −MBc = 0, or equivalently
(θ − 1)pyA∗ =
(
η−1
η
)
TA∗,
(
θ−1
θ
)
pyB∗ = (η − 1)TB∗
with p the relative price of the investment good. Taking the ratio of these
expressions yields TA∗/TB∗ = η. Now let EBc = EBy = 1 and EAc = EA∗c ,
EAy = EA∗y as given by (84) and (85), and consider T (k, y) as defined by (2).
We get
TA∗ = α
B
1 (θ−ρβA1 )
αA1 (1−ρβB1 θ)
TB∗ ≡ ηTB∗ (86)
with η = αB1 (θ − ρβA1 )/αA1 (1− ρβB1 θ) > 1 for any θ > 1 under Assumption
3. Therefore, we conclude that
cA∗ = TB∗, cB∗ = ηTA∗
The result follows assuming θ ∈ (1, θ¯) with θ¯ = 1/ρβB1 .
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6.7 The characteristic polynomial under free-trade
At a steady-state under free-trade we have y∗ = k∗. Let us introduce the
following notations:
T (k, y) = TA(kA(k, y), yA(k, y)) + TB(kB(k, y), yB(k, y)) (87)
and T ∗ij = Tij(k∗, k∗), i, j = 1, 2. We thus have c∗ = T (k∗, k∗) and
V (kt, yt) =
T (kt,yt)1−σ
1−σ
Total differenciation of equation (22) gives
dkt+2
[
1 + σρ T
∗2
1
c∗T ∗12
]
+ dkt+1
[ T ∗22
ρT ∗12 +
T ∗11
T ∗12 − σ(1 + ρ)
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
]
+ dkt
[
1
ρ + σ
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
]
= 0
Straightforward computations give the characteristic polynomial
Pf (x) = x2 − Tf (σ)x+Df = 0 (88)
with
Df = 1ρ , Tf (σ) =
−T
∗
11
T ∗12
− T
∗
22
ρT ∗12
+σ(1+ρ)
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
1+σρ
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
(89)
and T ∗1 = TA1 (kA(k∗, k∗), yA(k∗, k∗)) = TB1 (kB(k∗, k∗), yB(k∗, k∗)). We
know from Nishimura and Yano [26] that:
Lemma 6.6. Along a free-trade equilibrium, the second partial derivatives
of T (k, y) satisfy the following:
T11(k, y) = 1Θ
[
TA11(k
A, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ TB11(kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
T12(k, y) = 1Θ
[
TA12(k
A, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ TB12(kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
T22(k, y) = 1Θ
[
TA22(k
A, yA)|HB(kB, yB)|+ TB22(kB, yB)|HA(kA, yA)|
]
where
|H i(ki, yi)| ≡ T i11(ki, yi)T i22(ki, yi)− T i12(ki, yi)2 > 0
Θ ≡ [TA11(kA, yA) + +TB11(kB, yB)] [TA22(kA, yA) + TB22(kB, yB)]
− [TA12(kA, yA) + TB12(kB, yB)]2 > 0
Final simplifications give:
T ∗11
T ∗12 =
TA11(k
A,yA)|HB(kB ,yB)|+TB11(kB ,yB)|HA(kA,yA)|
TA12(k
A,yA)|HB(kB ,yB)|+TB12(kB ,yB)|HA(kA,yA)|
T ∗22
ρT ∗12 =
TA22(k
A,yA)|HB(kB ,yB)|+TB22(kB ,yB)|HA(kA,yA)|
ρ[TA12(kA,yA)|HB(kB ,yB)|+TB12(kB ,yB)|HA(kA,yA)|]
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12 =
ΘTA1 (k
A(k∗,k∗),yA(k∗,k∗))2
c∗[TA12(kA,yA)|HB(kB ,yB)|+TB12(kB ,yB)|HA(kA,yA)|]
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6.8 The function Tf (σ)
Note first that under Assumption 4
Tf (0) = −T
∗
11
T ∗12 −
T ∗22
ρT ∗12 < 0 and Tf (+∞) = 1 + ρ
−1 ≥ 2
Lemma 6.7. Under Assumption 4, there exists σ∗f ∈ (0,+∞) such
that Tf (σ) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in σ over [0, σ∗f ) ∪
(σ∗f ,+∞). Moreover, limσ→σ∗f− Tc(σ) = −∞ and limσ→σ∗f+ Tc(σ) = +∞.
Proof : Straightforward computations from (89) give
T ′f (σ) = T
∗2
1
c∗T ∗12
1+ρ
„
1+
T ∗11
T ∗12
+
T ∗22
ρT ∗12
«
»
1+σρ
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
–2
= ΘT
∗2
1
c∗[TA12|HB |+TB12|HA|]
2
TA12|HB |
»
1+ρ
„
1+
TA11
TA12
+
TA22
ρTA12
«–
+TB12|HA|
»
1+ρ
„
1+
TB11
TB12
+
TB22
ρTB12
«–
»
1+σρ
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
–2
with |HA| > 0 and |HB| > 0. Under Assumption 4 we get for any ρ ∈ (0, 1):
TA12 = −T
A
1 (k
A/θ)ρ
kA−gA
{
(1−αA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )−(1−αA1 −αA2 )αA1 βA2 θ
θαA2 (β
A
1 +β
A
2 )+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
}
< 0
TB12 = −T
B
1 k
Bρ
kB−gB
{
(1−αB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )(1−ρβB1 θ)−(1−αB1 −αB2 )αB1 βB2
αB2 (β
B
1 +β
B
2 )+(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ
}
< 0
and
1 + ρ
(
1 + T
A
11
TA12
+ T
A
22
ρTA12
)
= (θ − ρβA1 ) ρ(1−β
A
1 )(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )+αA2 [βA2 +(1−βA1 −βA2 )θ]
(1−αA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )−(1−αA1 −αA2 )αA1 βA2 θ
> 0
1 + ρ
(
1 + T
B
11
TB12
+ T
B
22
ρTB12
)
= (1− ρβB1 θ) ρ(1−β
B
1 )(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )+
αB2
θ
(θβB2 +1−βB1 −βB2 )
(1−αB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )(1−ρβB1 θ)−(1−αB1 −αB2 )αB1 βB2
> 0
It follows that T ′f (σ) < 0. Moreover, there exists a critical value σ∗f as
defined by
σ∗f = − c
∗T ∗12
ρT ∗21
= − c
∗[TA12|HB |+TB12|HA|]
ρΘ(TA1 )
2
(90)
such that the denominator of Tf (σ) is equal to zero when σ = σ∗f . When
σ = σ∗f , the numerator of Tf (σ) is equal to
−T ∗11T ∗12 −
T ∗22
ρT ∗12 −
1+ρ
ρ = −1ρ
[
1 + ρ
(
1 + T
∗
11
T ∗12 +
T ∗22
ρT ∗12
)]
= −1ρ
TA12|HB |
»
1+ρ
„
1+
TA11
TA12
+
TA22
ρTA12
«–
+TB12|HA|
»
1+ρ
„
1+
TB11
TB12
+
TB22
ρTB12
«–
TA12|HB |+TB12|HA|
which is negative for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) under Assumption 4. It follows that
limσ→σ∗f− Tf (σ) = −∞ and limσ→σ∗f+ Tf (σ) = +∞.
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6.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Proceeding as in the case of the closed economy, we only need to show that
1 + Tf (0) + 1/ρ > 0, i.e.
hf (ρ) =
(1+ρ)
ρ −
T ∗11
T ∗12 −
T ∗22
ρT i∗12
=
TA12|HB |
»
1+ρ
„
1−T
A
11
TA12
− T
A
22
ρTA12
«–
+TB12|HA|
»
1+ρ
„
1−T
B
11
TB12
− T
B
22
ρTB12
«–
ρ[TA12|HB |+TB12|HA|]
> 0
When ρ = 1, we have
hf (1) =
2T ∗12−T ∗11−T ∗22
T ∗12 = −
“
1 −1
”0@ T ∗11 T ∗12
T ∗12 T ∗22
1A0@ 1
−1
1A
T ∗12
Under Assumption 4 we have T ∗12 < 0 and the function T (k, y) as defined
by (87) is obviously strictly concave so that hf (1) < 0. We also get:
1 + ρ
(
1− TA11
TA12
− TA22
ρTA12
)
= 2(1 + ρ)
− (θ−ρβ
A
1 )[ρ(1−βA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )+αA2 [βA2 +(1−βA1 −βA2 )θ]]
(1−αA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )−(1−αA1 −αA2 )αA1 βA2 θ
1 + ρ
(
1− TB11
TB12
− TB22
ρTB12
)
= 2(1 + ρ)
−
(1−ρβB1 θ)
»
ρ(1−βB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )+
αB2
θ
(θβB2 +1−βB1 −βB2 )
–
(1−αB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )(1−ρβB1 θ)−(1−αB1 −αB2 )αB1 βB2
and thus under Assumptions 4 and 5
lim
ρ→0
1 + ρ
(
1− TA11
TA12
− TA22
ρTA12
)
=
αA2 [2αA1 (βA1 +βA2 )−2βA1 −βA2 −(1−βA1 −βA2 )θ]
(1−αA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )−(1−αA1 −αA2 )αA1 βA2
> 0
lim
ρ→0
1 + ρ
(
1− TB11
TB12
− TB22
ρTB12
)
= 2α
B
1 θ(β
B
1 +β
B
2 )−θ(2βB1 +βB2 )−(1−βB1 −βB2 )
θ[(1−αB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )−(1−αB1 −αB2 )αB1 βB2 ]
> 0
It follows that limρ→0 hf (ρ) = +∞. Therefore, there exists ρ¯f ∈ (0, 1) such
that hf (ρ) > 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ). We then conclude that when ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯f ),
there exists σ¯f ∈ (0, σ∗f ) such that the free-trade steady-state k∗ is saddle-
point stable for all σ ∈ (σ¯f ,+∞). The existence of period-two cycles when
σ crosses σ¯f from above follows from the flip bifurcation theorem. The
bifurcation value σ¯f is obtained as the solution of 1 + Tf (σ) + 1/ρ = 0 and
is equal to
σ¯f = −
1+ρ
ρ
−T
∗
11
T ∗12
− T
∗
22
ρT ∗12
2(1+ρ)
T ∗21
c∗T ∗12
= −
c∗
»
TA12|HB |
„
1+ρ
ρ
−T
A
11
TA12
− T
A
22
ρTA12
«
+TB12|HA|
„
1+ρ
ρ
−T
B
11
TB12
− T
B
22
ρTB12
«–
2(1+ρ)Θ(TA1 )
2
(91)
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6.10 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us introduce the following notations:
α1β2(1−α1−α2)
(1−α1)(1−ρβ1) ≡ Zi1,
αA1 β
A
2 θ(1−αA1 −αA2 )
(1−αA1 )(θ−βA1 )
≡ ZA2 , α
B
1 β
B
2 (1−αB1 −αB2 )
(1−αB1 )(1−θβB1 )
≡ ZB2
1+βB1
2(βB1 +β
B
2 )
≡ ZB3 , 1−β
B
1 −βB2 +θ(2βB1 +βB2 )
2θ(βB1 +β
B
2 )
≡ ZB4
In the proof of Proposition 2, assume that inequality (59) applied to country
A is not satisfied, i.e. αA1 β
A
2 − αA2 βA1 < ZA1 for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1). It
follows that the closed-economy steady-state of country A is saddle-point
stable with monotone convergence for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1). Consider then
condition (26) in Assumption 4. Straightforward computations give ZA1 >
ZA2 . It follows that all the conditions of Proposition 5 for country A may
be satisfied for the free-trade steady-state while the closed-economy steady-
state is characterized by monotone convergence for any σ ≥ 0.
For country B we have ZB1 < ZB2 for any given ρ ∈ (0, 1) and ZB3 > ZB4
since θ > 1. It follows that if αB1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 > ZB2 and αB1 > ZB3 , then all the
conditions of Proposition 5 for country B are satisfied along the free-trade
steady-state while the closed-economy optimal path is also characterized
by endogenous fluctuations (period-2 cycles) in the neighborhood of the
flip bifurcation value σ¯Bc . As a result endogenous fluctuations arise at the
world level while country A is characterized by monotone convergence in the
closed-economy case.
6.11 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the same characterization for country A as in the proof of Theorem
1. Then all the conditions of Proposition 5 for country A are satisfied for
the free-trade steady-state while the closed-economy steady-state is charac-
terized by monotone convergence for any σ ≥ 0.
If for country B, αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 > ZB2 and ZB3 > αB1 > ZB4 , then all
the conditions of Proposition 5 for country B are satisfied along the free-
trade steady-state while the closed-economy optimal path is characterized
by saddle-point stability with damped fluctuations or monotone convergence
depending on whether σ ≶ σB∗c . As a result endogenous fluctuations arise
at the world level while both closed-economy countries are characterized by
saddle-point stability.
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6.12 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider the bound σ¯Bc and σ¯f as defined by (61) and (91) respectively. We
get σ¯f > σ¯Bc if and only if
−
c∗
»
TA12|HB |
„
1+ρ
ρ
−T
A
11
TA12
− T
A
22
ρTA12
«
+TB12|HA|
„
1+ρ
ρ
−T
B
11
TB12
− T
B
22
ρTB12
«–
Θ(TA1 )
2
> −
c¯B T¯B12
„
1+ρ
ρ
− T¯
B
11
T¯B12
− T¯
B
22
ρT¯B12
«
(T¯B1 )
2
(92)
Using the fact that along the free-trade steady-state with EBc = EBy = 1,
EAc = EA∗c , EAy = EA∗y and θ ∈ (1, θ¯), we have kA∗ = θyA∗, kB∗ = yB∗/θ,
kA∗ = θkB∗, c∗ = cA∗ + cB∗ = TA∗ + TB∗ and TAj (k
A, yA) = TBj (k
B, yB),
j = 1, 2, we derive after tedious computations that when 1− αB1 − αB2 = 0,
inequality (92) is equivalent to the following
1
Θ
(
θ−ρβA1
αA1
+ 1−ρβ
B
1 θ
αB1
){ |HB |
(θ−ρβA1 )
(
2(1+ρ)[(1−αA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )(θ−ρβA1 )−(1−αA1 −αA2 )αA1 βA2 θ]
θαA2 (β
A
1 +β
A
2 )+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
− (θ−ρβ
A
1 )[ρ(1−βA1 )(αA1 βA2 −αA2 βA1 )+αA2 [βA2 +(1−βA1 −βA2 )θ]]
θαA2 (β
A
1 +β
A
2 )+(α
A
1 β
A
2 −αA2 βA1 )ρβA1
)
+ |HA|
(
2(1+ρ)αB2 (α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )−
»
ρ(1−βB1 )(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )+
αB2
θ
(θβB2 +1−βB1 −βB2 )
–
αB2 (β
B
1 +β
B
2 )+(α
B
1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 θ
)}
>
(1− ρβB1 )
(αB1 β
B
2 −αB2 βB1 )[2+ρ(1+βB1 )−2(1+ρ)αB1 ]−(1−βB1 )αB2
αB1 [αB2 (βB1 +βB2 )+(αB1 βB2 −αB2 βB1 )ρβB1 ]
The modified condition (38) in Assumption 7 implies that 2 + ρ(1 + βB1 )−
2(1 + ρ)αB1 > 0 for any ρ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, there exists  > 0 such that if
αB1 β
B
2 − αB2 βB1 ∈
(
(1−βB1 )αB2
2+ρ(1+βB1 )−2(1+ρ)αB1
,
(1−βB1 )αB2
2+ρ(1+βB1 )−2(1+ρ)αB1
+ 
)
,
the right-hand-side is positive but lower than the left-hand-side. The result
follows.
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